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 In the recent decade, gender diversity has become an ever-standing subject. Inside this 
theme, many factors have been mentioned and studied, making headlines in the media, 
like gender pay gap. Given this, a shift in the companies’ objectives has happened, where 
they are concerned not only with their financial goals but also with their social impact. 
Notwithstanding, the financial and social components are not separated and that is 
exactly what this paper intends to analyze by taking into account the gender diversity 
and checking whether such factor has an impact in the company’s financial performance 
and, if so, whether it is positive or negative. 
 
 In order to do that, we need to first introduce the support for portfolio performance 
evaluation which can be divided between the conditional and the unconditional 
performance evaluation. The former takes into account the dynamic economy we live in, 
although with more complex models (also more prone for misspecification errors), while 
the latter assumes a static reality, allowing for more practical models, that are easily 
applicable to a set of data. From these, it is highlighted the models that make a portfolio’s 
returns to depend on three, four and five factors, which are also the ones applied to the 
set of data analyzed. 
 
 Our portfolios were built using a document from EWOB (European Women on Boards) 
where the companies from Stoxx 600 are given a score, based on the ratio of women that 
occupy a board position on these companies’ boards. With this document, two types of 
portfolios were formed: Top 20 (with a high ratio of women on board) and Bottom 20 
(with a low ratio of women on board).  
 
 In the end, we found that both the four and the five-factor model suited the data 
adequately, with our analysis suggesting that the presence of more women on the 
companies’ boards is not connected with a better performance.  
 











































 Na década passada, a diversidade de género tornou-se num tema omnipresente. 
Diversos fatores foram analisados sendo que alguns, como a diferença salarial entre 
géneros, teve grande impacto mediático. Dado isto, observou-se uma alteração nos 
objetivos das empresas, verificando-se maior preocupação não só com a performance 
financeira, mas também com o impacto social. Não obstante, ambas as partes estão 
interligadas e é exatamente isso que este trabalho de final de mestrado pretende analisar, 
verificando se a diversidade de género tem impacto na performance financeira da 
empresa e, caso tenha, se o mesmo é positivo ou negativo.  
 
 De modo a atingir esse objetivo, é necessário introduzir o suporte teórico para a análise 
de performance de portefólios, que pode ser dividido em condicional ou incondicional. 
O primeiro tem em conta a economia dinâmica na qual estamos inseridos, apresentando 
modelos mais complexos (também mais propícios a erros de especificação), enquanto o 
último assume uma realidade estática, permitindo modelos mais práticos, facilmente 
aplicados a um conjunto de dados. Destes últimos, são realçados os modelos que fazem 
o retorno de um portefólio depender de três, quatro e cinco fatores, sendo os modelos 
aplicados ao conjunto de dados que analisamos.  
 
 Construímos o nosso portefólio através do documento da organização EWOB (European 
Women On Board) onde as empresas que constituem o Stoxx 600 são classificadas de 
acordo com o rácio de mulheres que ocupam posições nos seus Conselhos de Direção. 
Assim, foram criados dois tipos de portefólios: Top 20 (com um rácio elevado de 
mulheres no Conselho de Direção) e o Bottom 20 (com um rácio baixo de mulheres no 
Conselho de Direção). 
 
 No final, concluímos que ambos os modelos de quatro e cinco fatores se encontravam 
bem ajustados aos nossos dados, sugerindo que a presença de mais mulheres nos 
Conselhos de Direção das empresas não está associado a um incremento de performance. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Performance Condicional/Incondicional de Portefólio; Diversidade de 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
 Diversity on boards is not a new issue on corporate governance. Across Europe, 
many countries have addressed it throughout the years, by taking different paths: 
thorough legislation, through quotas and even through voluntary targets. 
Notwithstanding, it is now reaching some important milestones, setting the 
standards higher. As of May 2020, FTSE 350 Index reached 33% of women on 
boards, being this accomplishment built over 9 years, from a 10% average on 2011. 
In contrast, the S&P500, as of June 2020, has only 31 female CEO’s, as opposed to 81 
in 2000. Even though the time intervals aren’t comparable, it still shows how 
different the development has been among markets in the whole world. 
 
 Corporate governance's impact in financial performance has been studied in past 
years, but such a concept has many factors included which may not allow to retrieve 
the actual effect of each factor. Having said that, more recent literature has focused 
into one of its components, gender diversity, and its impact on the financial 
performance of the companies and its subsequent returns to the company’s 
shareholders. 
 
 By itself, financial performance has been a theme for a long time, with works like 
the one developed by Markowitz (1952) igniting the financial world into asset 
pricing. The former author introduced a normative theory of how an investor 
should behave, reinforcing the importance of diversification and the trade-off 
between expected return and variance. Afterwards, several authors added to this 
work, presenting one model that, even nowadays, is used: CAPM (Capital Asset 
Pricing Model). Such model can be said to be originated in Treynor (1961), Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965). Nevertheless, this model was not perfect and, while some 
authors tested its robustness, as in Black et al. (1972), or tried to extend it, like in 




 However, the CAPM made the excess return of an asset to be linearly dependent 
only on the asset’s sensibility to market variations (measured by its Beta) and some 
authors discovered that more factors should be considered when trying to explain 
assets’ returns, as size in Banz (1981) and debt-to-equity ratio in Bhandari (1988). All 
these works culminated in the birth of further models who aimed at explaining the 
average returns, starting with Fama & French (1993) three-factor model (adding the 
size of the company and its book-to-market ratio as factors to be considered, besides 
the market factor already proposed in the CAPM). Such a model was followed by 
the four-factor model, developed by Carhart (1997), by joining the work of 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) on the momentum factor to the previous model.  
Notwithstanding, Fama & French (2015) came back again with an improvement on 
their previous model, while not using the momentum factor since the tests they 
realized did not reveal a significant impact from this factor. Instead, they added 
factors that reflected the company’s profitability (RMW) and investment profile 
(CMA).  
 
 Despite being different among themselves, these models assume a static reality 
where loading of factors, like Beta, remain constant over time. Some authors 
disagreed with this view and decided to propose an alternative where the 
performance of the assets was conditional and Beta would vary over time, in the 
hope of reflecting the impact that our dynamic economy has. Jagannathan & Wang 
(1996) did exactly that by extending CAPM to a conditional performance, applying 
what Ferson & Harvey (1991) already had mentioned regarding time-variation in 
Beta, and reinforced by their empirical analysis in Ferson & Harvey (1999). 
Additionally, certain authors also tested these models on mutual funds, as Ferson 
& Schadt (1996), while making use of Jensen (1968) constant, but modifying it in 
order to make it conditional on the information available and finding that mutual 
funds’  Beta are correlated with public information.  
 
 Nonetheless, these models had a complex methodology and certain authors 
proposed different alternatives to address this issue, like Wang (2003) who applied 
a simpler methodology to allow these models to not have errors derived from 
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misspecifications and retain their validity, or Ferson & Siegel (2001) who proposed 
nonlinear functions of conditional parameters. 
 
 More recently, the board composition has also been studied along with its impact 
on the financial performance of a company. Adams & Ferreira (2007) investigate 
whether the boards should be divided in order to perform different roles: advisory 
and monitoring. Despite not specifically studying the impact of having women on 
boards, it was a support for Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008), where such a study 
was made, in the context of the Spanish economy, showing us that the presence of 
women on the board, on average, does not destroy value for the shareholders. In a 
way, this issue is presented as a dichotomy since, on the one hand, women may 
bring new perspectives and ideas, improving the financial performance of the 
company, while, on the other hand, they may bring an undesired outcome due to 
being selected in order to respect a mandatory quota, for example, and not because 
of their qualifications.  
 
 Furthermore, researchers also found that their results were not unbiased, since 
some companies did not have enough women on their board to do a proper analysis, 
as reported in Chapple & Humphrey (2014), supporting the actions that were being 
taken across the world to address gender diversity in boards. At an European level, 
we can see an example of this measures in Ahern & Dittmar (2012) where they study 
the impact of Norway’s mandatory quota of 40% of the board being composed by 
women, introduced in 2003. As expected, firms reacted differently to the imposed 
quota, either reshuffling their members or going private to avoid mandatory 
compliance with such law. 
 
 Connecting gender diversity with stock prices, Gul et. al (2011) studied the impact 
of the presence of women on the board on the stock price informativeness and found 
that there was a positive relation between them. Notwithstanding, such positive 
connections was shown to not only exist on developed markets but also on 
developing markets, like in Vietnam by Nguyen et. al (2015). 
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 In order to try to contribute to this subject of the impact of gender diversity on 
firm’s performance, we decided to use a document from European Women On Boards 
(EWOB), where they publish a Gender Diversity Index (GDI) on firms from the 
Stoxx 600, and build two portfolios with the Top 20 firms (the ones with a GDI score 
above 0.8) and the Bottom 20 firms (GDI score below 0.2), where 1 is gender 
equality, above and below 1 is female and male dominance, respectively.  
 
 For this, we gathered monthly information on the stock price and market value of 
the companies in the document, from Datastream, for the period beginning on 
January 2000 and ending on December 2019, and, after organizing the time series 
data, applied the unconditional three, four and five-factor models, already 
mentioned above, to the two portfolios, dividing them into two categories: equally-
weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW). 
 
 The subsequent outcome suggested that the four and five-factor models are both a 
good fit, without one having a clear advantage over the other. Nevertheless, on 
both, our outcome suggested that the presence of women on the boards did not 
benefit the companies, with the Bottom 20 portfolios appearing to have an 
advantage. Furthermore, this analysis also took into account different market 
proxies (the one used in Fama & French  (1993) and Fama & French (2015), the Stoxx 
600 index and the MSCI index), in order to complement it and allow for further 
analysis on the sensibility of our portfolios to the market factor. 
 
 To summarize, this work consists of 4 chapters. Chapter 1 is the literature review 
and theoretical background, where the theory of portfolio performance evaluation 
is exposed, from its first steps until the most recent, taking into account the dynamic 
economy we are inserted. Still in here, the gender diversity is addressed by making 
use of the literature available on the subject. Afterwards, on Chapter 2, we describe 
the methodology of our research, with an explanation of the data gathered, along 
with the models we intend to estimate. The outcome of this is displayed in Chapter 
3, where our regressions are presented, and the subsequent results are discussed. 
Finally, on Chapter 4, the main points of our work are summarized, the limitations 
exposed and suggestions for further research are made. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
2.1 Portfolio Performance Evaluation 
 
 Over the last decades, a lot of research has been done regarding security analysis 
and asset pricing. Markowitz (1952), assessed the process of selecting a portfolio, 
focusing on the investor’s beliefs about the future performance of securities. While 
acknowledging diversification as a must-have investment behavior, the author also 
recognizes that the returns from securities are highly intercorrelated, not allowing 
diversification to fully eliminate the variance of returns in stock prices, which is a 
measure of risk.  
 
 Having said that, at a certain point, the investor is faced with a decision: either 
he/she tries to increase the expected return, accepting an increase in variance, or 
he/she tries to reduce variance, giving up expected return in exchange. Given that, 
Markowitz (1952) shows that investors should try to obtain the maximum expected 
return possible, for a given level of variance, or the minimum variance possible, for 
a given level of expected return. This can be seen as a guideline to rational 
investment rather than speculative behavior.  
 
 Such a procedure implies, for a large and representative sample, diversification. 
Furthermore, even in the case of two portfolios with equal variance, any 
combination of both will result in a decrease in variance, unless both portfolios are 
perfectly correlated. Therefore, this diversification requires some insight from 
investors since it does not depend exclusively on the quantity of different securities 
held but also on how they correlate with each other. In a way, Markowitz (1952), 
through a mean-variance approach, presents us with a normative theory of how 
investors should behave. 
 
 An empirical explanation for diversification was then provided by Tobin (1958), 
which inquired about the holding of a risk-free asset due to expectations of losses 
in other assets. The investor’s decision for mitigating risk, in the form of interest rate 
risk, will eventually fall in the holding proportion of a risk-free asset and a portfolio, 
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which is composed by diverse assets, following Markowitz (1952) rational 
procedures. 
 
 Notwithstanding, Treynor (1961) disagreed with Tobin (1958) since, in the former’s 
opinion, the investor attempts diversification to mitigate equity risk instead of 
interest rate risk. For Treynor (1961), the problem lies in selecting a combination 
between fixed-return and equity assets, hence not considering both price level and 
interest rate risks. Nevertheless, the author explains that despite both risks being 
important, when we consider the US economy, equity risk has a bigger impact, and 
the author uses that as a justification for his focus on it. 
 
 With these assumptions properly established, Treynor (1961) develops his model 
and realizes that a decisive factor for investment, besides the uncertainty present in 
every investment, is the risk premium. In fact, each investment has its own risk 
premium, so the overall value is achieved taking into account the portion that each 
investment represents. Furthermore, the author also states that the risk premium 
and the standard error share a relationship when we think about efficient 
combinations, since each of them has the same ratio of risk premium to standard 
error. 
 
 In line with Markowitz (1952), Treynor (1961) concludes that the risk premium in a 
share belonging to a certain investment is proportional to the covariance of such 
investment with the total amount of investments in the market. The author also 
suggests that a distinction between risks that are affected by changes in the general 
conditions of the market and those that are not, should be made. This makes 
investments that are exposed to the former to possess a cost of capital equal to the 
risk-free rate, while the investments that are exposed to the latter require a more 
thoughtful approach. 
 
 On a similar note, and not being aware of Treynor (1961) work, Sharpe (1964) 
focuses on explaining the relationship between the price of an asset and its risk. It 
was known that diversification would mitigate some of the risk intrinsic to the asset 
but that only revealed that the biggest factor for an asset’s price was not its total 
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risk, saying nothing about the risk component that is specific to each asset and, 
therefore, relevant to determine its price. 
 
 By joining the works of Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1952), Sharpe (1964) shows 
that investors are expected to choose an optimal portfolio, that provides them with 
the highest utility. However, since assets are correlated among themselves, this 
makes the portfolio formation to not depend solely on the combinations of expected 
return and risk. Furthermore, investors’ actions in the market causes price 
movements and, adding the fact that many combinations of risky assets are efficient, 
investors may opt for different combinations among the options available. 
 
 Notwithstanding, when the equilibrium conditions are met, the combinations 
considered have to possess perfect, and positive, correlations among themselves, 
since they all lie in the capital market line (constructed by the author to show all the 
possible combinations following rational procedures). This also corroborates the 
existence of a simple linear relationship between the expected return and the 
standard deviation for efficient combinations.  
 
 Therefore, Sharpe (1964) characterizes an asset’s expected return as dependent on 
a risk-free rate and the responsiveness of the asset to variations in the economic 
activity. High responsiveness is expected to have higher expected returns and the 
opposite happens when there is a low level of responsiveness. To this variability, 
the author refers to as the systematic risk, which diversification allows the 
mitigation of, and states that the remainder of the asset’s return variations is caused 
by specific, and unsystematic, components, to which the investor is exposed. 
 
 Nevertheless, Lintner (1965) disagreed with Sharpe (1964) regarding the effects 
from the responsiveness of a stock to market variations. In the former’s opinion, the 
latter had only considered the risk effect, leaving behind the income effect. Both 
impact the securities expected rates of return the same way but that is not the case 
when we consider the impact on prices. On the one hand, the risk effect increases 
the expected rate of return, due to increased uncertainty, decreasing the stock price. 
On the other hand, the income effect comes as investors may consider that the 
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general conditions of the market may be favorable for a particular stock to have a 
great performance, raising its expected return and causing an increase in purchases 
which, in their turn, increase the stock price. In a way, the responsiveness to 
variations in the market index is not as straightforward as expected and depends on 
the net result of both risk and income effects. 
 
 Furthermore, the author also argues that, to reach Sharpe (1964) results, it would 
be required to consider an hypothetical situation where all systematic risks are 
neutralized and all specific risks, are equal to zero. As a consequence, Lintner (1965) 
also thinks that his diversification approach differs from Sharpe (1964), since the 
latter would not consider specific risk components in his analysis. For the former, 
the objective of diversification is not to mitigate risk but rather to select the best 
combination of expected return and risk, in a portfolio. 
 
To support that, Lintner (1965) establishes criteria to hold stocks within a portfolio, 
which was related with the portfolio expected rate of return, the variance of its 
return and how the stock being analyzed would behave if selected (i.e. how it 
correlates with the portfolio). The author considers this condition to be valid for 
every stock in the portfolio but brings our attention to the fact that it is not the same 
as the return per unit of portfolio risk which, according to him, has created a 
misunderstanding in previous situations. 
 
 The disagreement also reached the linear relationship between a security return 
and its standard deviation, where Lintner (1965) thought that it does not hold when 
we are considering the security to be within a portfolio. Instead, the author proposes 
that, under these circumstances, the risk of an individual security is determined by 
its correlation with other securities. 
 
 However, Fama (1968) showed that both, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) models, 
were right and that, actually, both were based on the same set of assumptions from 
Markowitz (1952), having the same conclusions regarding the measurement of risk 
and its relationship with the asset’s expected return. According to Fama (1968), the 
differences that authors mentioned were caused by each focusing on different 
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stochastic processes. More precisely, the author thinks that both Sharpe (1964) and 
Linter (1965) misunderstood the implications underlying Sharpe (1964) model and 
he demonstrates how it is possible to reach Lintner (1965) model and conclusions 
starting from the former’s model, showing that both are approaching the problem 
of capital asset pricing in a similar way. 
 
 With all the confusion sorted out by Fama (1968), the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) was born from the combined works of Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965). A model which predicted that the excess return of an asset was 
proportional to its beta (covariance of its returns with the returns of the market 
portfolio). In its simplest form, this model establishes a linear relationship between 
the asset’s beta and their excess returns. 
 
 Applying these developments, Jensen (1968) evaluated 115 open end mutual funds, 
in which he measured the forecasting ability of the portfolio manager to correctly 
predict the future prices of securities. To fulfill his objective, Jensen (1968) compares 
the risk premium realized by the portfolio with the level of risk that the portfolio’s 
composition suggests it should have. Since the portfolio risk was allowed to vary 
over time, this comparison regarding manager’s ability was decomposed in two 
components: prediction of market’s behavior (which the manager may want to do, 
in order to outperform it) and selection of individual securities (which, by 
evaluating the portfolio’s returns, also allows us to withdraw conclusions regarding 
the manager’s prowess). 
 
 In order to properly measure it, and consider the effects of risk on return, he used 
a non-zero constant in the model, denominated a, that would have a positive value 
if the manager had a good forecasting ability (i.e. the risk premium attained by the 
portfolio was higher than the expected risk premium, for a certain level of risk), 
would be null if the manager is doing as well as a random selection and negative if 
the manager were to perform worse than the random selection. However, the author 
calls our attention for the latter situation, which should be taken with caution, since 
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it is not a common outcome and may have underlying factors that are worth being 
analyzed before coming up with a conclusion.  
 
 The evidence found by Jensen (1968) points out that, on average, the chosen funds, 
and consequently their managers, were not able to forecast prices in such a way that 
would allow them to beat the market. Actually, the analysis suggests that their 
performance was not enough to cover their brokerage expenses, even when all other 
expenses are not considered. Notwithstanding, the author mentions that these 
results should be taken with caution since the dimension that concerns 
diversification was not considered. 
 
 Subsequently, Jensen (1969) complemented his work by performing a more in-
depth analysis of the same set of funds, adding criteria for measuring the efficiency 
of a portfolio as well, while also showing that this and the performance’s measures 
were connected. To properly address efficiency, the model developed allowed the 
testing of the semi- strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, in the sense that 
current prices already have reflected on them all the information available. 
 
 Starting with the relationship between performance and efficiency, Jensen (1969) 
considers three different situations: the scenario of a perfectly diversified portfolio, 
where both measures of performance and efficiency overlap (not forgetting the fact 
that even a diversified portfolio may become inefficient due to the actions of the 
manager), a scenario with a bad-performing portfolio, implying that it is also 
inefficient, and a scenario of a good-performing portfolio, which brings us to an 
ambiguous position where a portfolio will be efficient if the forecasting ability 
displayed by the manager is enough to overcome possible inefficiencies present in 
it. Nevertheless, these definitions should not be considered lightly since an investor 
may combine investments and, under those circumstances, a good-performing 
portfolio, even when not efficient, may be useful. 
 
 Jensen (1969) had similar conclusions to his previous work, in Jensen (1968), 
regarding the performance of funds, with the addition that their behavior resembled 
the expected from the semi-strong form of market efficiency hypothesis, although 
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funds were, on average, inefficient. This implies that the manager’s attempts to 
analyze the current and past prices has not yielded higher returns. However, in 
contrast with his previous findings, the author states that, if the funds’ expenses are 
added back to them, they would reveal a neutral performance instead of 
underperformance. Nonetheless, Jensen (1969) work favors the maintenance of a 
perfectly diversified portfolio. 
 
 As seen above, the CAPM was practical and was used in studies regarding portfolio 
performance evaluation. However, some authors took a different approach on the 
CAPM and decided to relax or extend some of its assumptions.  
 
 On this matter, Black et al. (1972) performs additional tests of the model in order to 
contribute to a better understanding of security returns. With that in mind, the 
authors decide to estimate the value of an average intercept (𝛼") which, if the model 
was correctly pricing the assets, should have an outcome that was not significantly 
different from zero.  
 
 The first results showed a negative 𝛼" for the portfolios with higher risk and a 
positive 𝛼" for the low-risk portfolios which means that, over the analysis period, 
securities with higher risk, on average, earned less than what the CAPM would 
predict while securities with lower risk, on average, earned more than what the 
CAPM would predict. After this first test, the authors used a two-factor model that, 
given certain circumstances, would yield the traditional model (CAPM), to perform 
cross-sectional tests on portfolios again. 
 
 In their model, the return of a security was a linear function of two factors: the 
market portfolio and a zero-beta portfolio (i.e. its covariance with the market 
portfolio is null) with minimum variance. Both factors have coefficients, but only 
the second factor has its coefficient depending on the security’s beta, earning it the 
name of beta factor. Under these circumstances, the CAPM would be consistent 
with the latter factor having a zero mean on its excess returns (meaning it would be 
equal to the risk-free rate). 
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 The outcome of the empirical tests revealed strong evidence in favor of rejecting 
the CAPM, since both, the excess returns and the factor itself, were significantly 
different from zero and economically significant, respectively. Nevertheless, the 
authors call our attention to the fact that, while they have asserted the significance 
of this factor, they have not proved its existence, since a direct test for it was not 
performed. They have, however, provided the proper economic rationale for its 
finding to be consistent with capital market equilibrium, suggesting the existence of 
other factors, besides the market, that systematically affects assets’ returns. 
 
 On the other hand, Merton (1973) opts to develop a model that, whilst respecting 
the simplicity and practicality of the CAPM and being consistent with its 
assumptions, would provide a more accurate description of the relationship among 
yields, in line with the empirical data. The author decides to extend the model, by 
actually making it intertemporal, arguing that this transformation would increase 
the model’s ability to capture effects that, otherwise, wouldn’t be noticed on the 
single-period CAPM. 
 
 This extension brings extra considerations, especially when selecting the portfolio, 
since the investor now has to take into account the relationship between current and 
future returns. Given this, the demand for assets will have a new component 
showing the investor’s desire for a certain asset in order to hedge against possible 
harmful changes in the investment opportunities. In fact, Merton (1973) states that, 
due to the interest rate changes over time, we cannot assume a constant set of 
opportunities for investment and should, instead, incorporate such changes in our 
analysis and interpret the effects that they cause.  
 
 By doing that, the author presents a situation where the investment decision is 
characterized by holdings that would provide both an efficient combination as well 
as the hedge already mentioned above. This will require a higher expected return 
for the incurrence of risk that is composed by the market risk and the risk of possible 
harmful changes in the investment opportunities set. From here, we can see that a 
security whose beta equals zero does not have an expected return that equals the 
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risk-free rate, differing from the CAPM and making Merton (1973) remark that his 
model seemed to better suit the data. The author even suggested his and Black et. al 
(1972) models could have potential for agreement, although his analysis was very 
simple and did not provide any solid conclusion. 
 
 Notwithstanding, the empirical tests of Black et. al (1972) and the extension of 
Merton (1973) have showed that there is a relationship between risk and average 
returns. Fama & MacBeth (1973) decided to test it and considered three hypotheses: 
linear relationship between the expected return in a security and its risk, beta being 
the only measure of risk of a security and, assuming that there are risk-averse 
investors in the market, higher risk should mean higher returns. 
 
 The authors consider that the linear relationship hypothesis has not been evaluated 
as it should, given its importance. According to them, this relationship would exist 
if the process of price formation in the capital market showed the investor’s desire 
to hold efficient portfolios. As for the second one, if beta is not the only measure of 
risk, then there would be premiums that were being paid for risks that did not 
contribute for the overall risk of an efficient portfolio, making the assumption that 
investors want to hold them fail. Last but not least, the remaining hypothesis was 
seen as a connector between the previous two and was expected to reveal the 
existence, on average, of a positive tradeoff between risk and return. 
 
 The outcome revealed that it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of risk-averse 
investors wanting to hold efficient portfolios and that there was, on average, a 
positive tradeoff between return and risk, measuring the latter from the portfolio 
perspective. Having said that, it implies that investors should consider a linear 
relationship between a security’s expected return and its portfolio risk, expecting a 
positive tradeoff between these two parameters and only needing the security’s beta 
to measure risk. Furthermore, since the hypotheses seemed to be corroborated, they 
can be seen as supportive of the existence of an efficient capital market. 
 
 The relationship between risk and return was also presented, although in a 
different perspective, in Ross (1976). In here, the author intended to focus on an 
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alternative model to CAPM because, even though he recognized that the tractability 
and linearity between expected return and  risk had conferred popularity to it, he 
points out the difficulty of theoretically justifying certain assumptions that it makes, 
such as the normality in returns.  
 
 Given that, the author starts by mentioning a condition, which is the arbitrage 
alternative to CAPM, that is expected to hold in both equilibrium and 
disequilibrium situations, with the distinguishing characteristic of the market 
portfolio not playing a special role. Developing this condition, Ross (1976) 
introduces a model where the expected return of an asset is dependent on different 
risk factors and their load (i.e. the sensitivity of the portfolio to changes in those risk 
factors, measured by betas). Additionally, such a model also makes the risk 
premium of an asset to be the sum of the risk factors premiums, weighted by their 
respective betas. 
 
 Having said that, Ross (1976) proposal is more closely connected to an arbitrage 
relation than an equilibrium relation and is expected to be robust. However, even 
though it does not require homogeneous investors’ anticipations, it requires that 
they share the same beliefs regarding the load of each factor (beta). Furthermore, it 
is still exposed to the possibility of the agents disagreeing on the nature, and the 
probability distributions, of the risk factors since they are not easily identifiable. 
 
 Nevertheless, Ross (1976) model brought yet another variant for academic 
empirical studies that were evaluating portfolio performance. Among them, 
Jensen’s a was one of the most widely used metrics to measure performance. 
However, it wasn’t free from controversy as documented in Grinblatt & Titman 
(1989), which makes a simple, yet insightful, reunion of the three main critics 
attached to these kind of measures: lack of a concrete and adequate market portfolio, 
overestimation of risk due to biased estimators and negative risk-adjusted returns 
caused by risk aversion levels that are higher than perceived. 
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 In their work, the authors reach some conclusions regarding such criticism. More 
precisely, they justify the existence of a market portfolio by its mathematical, rather 
than equilibrium, properties, propose a new and broader measure, from which 
Jensen’s a is a particular case, that  avoids the overestimation of risk and, ultimately, 
give a possible explanation for the risk aversion levels which they consider to be 
dependent on the information available to the investor at the time of decision, as 
well as whether it is already priced or not. 
 
 But the performance measures are not the only ones targeted by critics, and 
Grinblatt & Titman (1989) also highlighted one of the main critics pointed at 
CAPM’s empirical studies based on observable data that shows that, on average, 
smaller firms outperformed larger firms by a significant amount, as stated in Banz 
(1981). Nevertheless, Banz (1981) also warns that such results should be taken 
carefully, since it is not proven that the size effect, as he called the outcome, exists. 
In fact, there is the possibility that it is just a proxy for other factors that are not 
being considered and are correlated with size. 
 
 Notwithstanding, these last findings suggest the need to consider additional 
variables to explain a stock’s expected return. Several studies addressed this issue, 
like Bhandari (1988) who focused on an intuitive approach to the risk of common 
equity in a firm, by considering debt/equity ratio (DER) as a proxy for it. Bhandari 
(1988) suggests that, even with beta estimates being calculated with a proper 
method, as in Black et al. (1972), and the existence of a size effect, pointed by Banz 
(1981), DER still has a role in explaining a stock’s expected return. 
 
 DER was found to have a positive, and significant, impact on the expected return 
of a stock, while controlling for both, beta and the firm size. Furthermore, these 
results were not dependent on the chosen market proxy and suggested that 
observed premiums could be caused by other factors besides risk, supporting 
findings from previous studies. 
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 These new findings put in perspective the expected positive simple relation 
between the average stock returns and market beta, supported by the works of Black 
et. al (1972) and Fama & Macbeth (1973) and motivated the work of Fama & French 
(1992) where the impact of a combination of factors (market beta, size, earnings-to-
price ratio, leverage and book-to-market equity) in the expected stock returns is 
studied. 
 
 Since all the variables mentioned, despite being different, are connected to price, it 
was expected that there would be some redundancy. The results showed just that, 
with the combination of only two factors (size and book-to-market equity, the latter 
having more significance) representing the impact of the remaining (leverage and 
earnings-to-price ratio). Furthermore, they also suggested that beta does not seem 
to contribute in explaining the expected stock returns, supported by the fact that it 
had no explanatory power when used alone in the tests made. 
 
 These outcomes sustained a rational framework for asset-pricing, which was 
extended by the same authors in Fama & French (1993). In here, they decided to test 
whether their model would be appropriate to explain average returns in both stocks 
and bonds, while adding two more factors related to the term structure and default 
risk to better evaluate the latter. Additionally, they interchanged the factors between 
both type of securities to check whether there was an overlap between them. 
 
 The authors built six types of portfolios from the combinations of size and book-to-
market values, allowing them to calculate the difference in returns between small 
and big firms (SMB), between high and low book-to-market companies (HML) and 
the excess market return (MKT). These were used as factors and, along with the 
previously mentioned bond-factors, tests were performed to evaluate the fit and 
significance of the five factors (MKT, SMB, HML and the two bond factors) and the 
three factors (MKT, SMB, HML).  
 
 The results revealed that the three-factor model seemed to work well when the 
portfolio evaluated was only composed by stocks, making the five factors only 
required when there was a mix of stocks and bonds. Even though there was some 
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theoretical background for the inclusion of the bond factors when performing 
regressions on average stock returns, it was revealed that their effects were well 
captured by the MKT factor, hence supporting the choice of the three-factor model 
to explain average stock returns. Despite, in their previous work, having shown that 
the market factor did not have explanatory power when used alone, the authors 
find that there is the need for its inclusion in this model due to the fact that SMB and 
HML explain the differences in average returns across stocks, but not the differences 
on average returns between stocks and the risk-free asset, leaving this to be 
explained by the market factor. 
 
 Notwithstanding, this three-factor model was extended to a four-factor model by 
Carhart (1997), where the author added one momentum factor based on the work 
of Jegadeesh & Titman (1993). For Carhart (1997), the motivation for this extension 
came from the fact that the three-factor model did not seem to provide a proper 
explanation of cross-section variation when considering portfolios sorted by their 
momentum. 
 
 Regarding the new factor, Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) considered it by taking into 
account the behavior of individuals, which tend to over or underreact to 
information. Given that, it is possible to consider profitable trading strategies by 
selecting stocks, using their past returns as a criterion. Such a strategy is exactly 
what the authors proposed, holding portfolios that focused on having a long 
position in the past winners and a short position in the past losers, while rebalancing 
them accordingly. 
 
 For the period they analyzed, they obtained abnormal returns and evidence that 
these types of performances were not guaranteed for the long run, giving support 
to the conclusion that the impact of over or underreaction to information is not as 
simple as it was thought.  
 
 Nevertheless, these results contrasted with the findings of Carhart (1997), which 
suggested that the momentum trading strategy was not profitable at the individual 
security level. On the other hand, the author does find that funds with persistent 
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poor performance should be avoided while being cautious about good performing 
funds, since their performance is not guaranteed for the long run, in line with 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993). Last but not least, these performances are dependent on 
the investment costs, which have a direct and negative impact on it. 
 
 Furthermore, Carhart (1997) also evaluates the improvement in analysis by 
comparing the outcomes of CAPM, the three-factor model and his own four-factor 
model. From the first to the last, there is an improvement on pricing errors, 
supporting the better fit of the four-factor model for explaining cross-section 
variation on average stock returns. Nonetheless, Fama & French (2015) proposed a 
five-factor model, although not extending the four-factor model proposed by 
Carhart (1997), since their tests to the momentum factor revealed that its impact in 
portfolio performance was not significant. 
 
 Their focus went to the evidence of the variation in average returns, connected with 
profitability and investment, that the three-factor model failed to explain, and 
decided to add them to their previous model. To take them into account, Fama & 
French (2015) introduced RMW and CMA as the difference between the returns of 
stocks with high and low profitability and returns of stocks with low and high 
investment profiles, respectively. Furthermore, they use combinations between the 
factors to produce different three and four-factor models and compare the results 
with the five-factor model initially proposed, finding that the latter suits the data 
better than the three-factor model that they had proposed before. 
 
 The authors also found that one of the factors, related with book-to-market equity, 
seemed to be redundant, since it did not improve the results from the four-factor 
model formed with the other factors. Notwithstanding, if the objective of the 
analysis is not only on the abnormal returns but also in the impact of each factor, 
then the five-factor model remains the best option. 
 
 Despite the five-factor model fitting better the data than the three-factor model, 
there was still a type of portfolio, composed by small size stocks with high 
investment profile and low profitability, whose average returns are not properly 
 30 
explained by the model. This outcome was also found in Fama & French (2017), 
where the authors apply the five-factor model on a global and regional level across 
North America, Europe, Asia Pacific and Japan and compare it, as before, with the 
three-factor model. 
 
 In North America, the five factors were considered important, in contrast with 
Europe, where only four factors, excluding investment, are significant for 
explaining the average returns. Turning to Japan, book-to-market and profitability 
share the spotlight, although the former has a greater impact, while Asia Pacific has 
a similar outcome to Europe, although the investment factor still plays a role, even 
though not as big as the remaining four factors. 
 
 In the end, the five-factor model revealed itself as an improvement over the three-
factor model, even when applying it internationally, as long as the factors are 



















2.2. Conditional Performance 
 
  As we can see, CAPM has not been a model free from controversy, with attempts 
at improving, or replacing it, happening throughout its history. Having said that, 
there were some authors who preferred to take a different approach than the 
previous ones and, instead of accepting a static reality as an assumption, considered 
the possibilities of the dynamic patterns that characterize our economy. 
 
 Among them, were Jagannathan & Wang (1996) who looked at results as the ones 
presented in Banz (1981) and Bhandari (1988) as scenarios where it is possible to 
construct portfolios which CAPM cannot explain properly. These also highlight the 
absence of time variation in betas which, according to Ferson & Harvey (1991), 
should be considered due to the fact that time variation in the expected risk 
premium is one of the main contributors to explain portfolio returns. 
 
 In fact, Jagannathan & Wang (1996) don’t agree with CAPM’s assumption of betas 
that remain constant over time, since the firm’s risk may vary over the business 
cycle and, taking into account that the economy is dynamic, the relative shares of 
certain sectors may change over time, causing changes in the betas of firms that are 
present on those sectors. Therefore the authors consider that both, betas and 
expected returns, will be dependent on the amount and nature of information that 
is available at each moment in time, which leads to their evaluation of a conditional 
version of CAPM where an asset’s expected return is linearly related to its 
conditional beta, making it dependent on the information available. 
 
 Notwithstanding, it is also possible to idealize an unconditional model where the 
unconditional expected return is linear in a market beta and a premium beta 
(measure of beta variation over time) but, despite such a model containing the static 
CAPM, facilitating direct comparison between them, there are some considerable 
differences in the way certain variables were built, namely the return on aggregate 
wealth. In here, the authors decided to introduce a measure of return on human 
capital, trying to improve the explanatory power of the model and avoiding 
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interpretations where the market proxy selected is the main responsible for the 
undesirable outcome of CAPM, as it is possible in Fama & French (1992). 
 
 The outcome revealed that the conditional CAPM was significantly better than the 
static CAPM, being corroborated by the fact that size and book-to-market variables 
did not have as much impact on determining the part that the model could not 
explain, unlike the static version of CAPM, with examples in Banz (1981) and Fama 
& French (1992). 
 
 Nonetheless, this result may be biased due to each model’s assumptions. Based on 
that, Wang (2003) tested the conditional versions of CAPM, Fama & French (1993) 
three-factor model and Jagannathan & Wang (1996) conditional model, while 
applying a methodology that did not require the formal specification of as many 
parameters, without losing relevance or validity. 
 
 Among some of the outcome achieved, Wang (2003) finds that although size and 
book-to-market have an impact on explaining average returns, they reveal it 
through different patterns. Furthermore, the author also tested Jegadeesh & Titman 
(1993) momentum strategy, which the static CAPM failed to explain, and the results 
of applying the conditional version of the three-factor model were not rejected, 
suggesting that winners are inclined to have higher conditional expected returns. 
 
Given this, Wang (2003) shows the importance of measuring the time-varying 
returns properly, which was in line with the work developed by Ferson & Harvey 
(1999), who were aware of the existing concerns about the factors used in the three 
factor model, since they were not derived from a theoretical background. 
Nevertheless, the authors, building upon their previous work, focused on whether 
the economy dynamic patterns were reflected in the model while knowing that, 
considering only the three factors presented by Fama & French (1993), it is expected 
that the patterns mentioned above will produce biased outcomes. 
 
 After conducting empirical tests, while using a set of economy-wide variables, 
Ferson & Harvey (1999) concluded that controlling for time-variation improved the 
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model, which had implications to the evaluation of asset prices, since the results 
revealed that there was information not being captured by the most widely used 
models up until then. 
 
 On that subject, Ferson & Schadt (1996) had already shown that, given the time 
variation on expected returns and risk, it was likely that models with unconditional 
approaches would not be reliable. To counter this problem, the authors analyze the 
influence on investment performance of including lagged information variables on 
their tests, hoping to reduce the bias caused by public information. 
 
 Such a conditional approach was seen as advantageous due to the possibility of 
controlling for the dynamic patterns that are present in the economy and influence 
returns, unlike the traditional, and unconditional, approach. Furthermore, 
dynamism can also be introduced by managers’ own behavior on selecting 
investment opportunities and, controlling for that, is also seen as an important 
advantage. 
 
 Since Ferson & Schadt (1996) analyzed mutual fund performance, they based their 
work on Jensen (1968) model, although modifying it in order to make it conditional 
on the information available. Such modification neutralized previously considered 
poor performance by Jensen and suggested that mutual funds’ betas are correlated 
with public information, showing that variation on their risk exposure would be 
dependent on it. Such evidence, once more, gave support to the statistical and 
economical significance of conditioning returns on information. 
 
 These outcomes, together with the works of Jagannathan & Wang (1996) and Wang 
(2003), were clear examples of the use of conditional models to evaluate asset prices. 
Nevertheless, these models weren’t bulletproof and their construction, mainly in 
the way the data was handled, was targeted by the work of Ferson et al. (2008).  
 
 In it, the authors intended to study the impact of data mining and spurious 
regression. The former refers to the utilization of the same datasets by many 
researchers, while attempting to estimate their models. The later comes from the 
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existence of high autocorrelation from a variable which, if not taken into account, 
may wrongly lead to a conclusion of a statistically significant relation. Furthermore, 
such problems are strongly related and, when both are present, tend to magnify the 
impact of each other. These issues are important due to the mainstream use of 
lagged variables and datasets in conditional modelling that may fall prey to the 
problems mentioned above.  
 
 Their analysis suggested different outcomes for each conditional estimator. When 
it comes to betas, they seem to be relatively robust to the effects of either data mining 
or spurious regression. However, in order to properly take into account time 
variation, as Ferson & Harvey (1991) and Ferson & Harvey (1999) recommended, 
and get a consistent estimator, a linear term in the lagged variable must be included. 
On the other hand, while alphas reveal some robustness to the issues already 
mentioned, their time variation estimator seems to have a bias. Additionally, the 
authors also find that its absence from a model will cause the conditional estimator 
for beta to be biased.  
 
 Notwithstanding, the authors also test a regression where time variation in betas is 
suspended, similar to the work of Jagannathan & Wang (1996) who considered time 
variation but not in an explicit manner, in order to observe the impact on alpha. The 
evidence gathered shows that the importance given in literature to time variation in 
alphas may be excessive, leading the authors to propose that the current conditional 
asset pricing models can be a better fit than what it may be suggested from certain 
studies on them. 
 
 In fact, these models also require a different approach to achieve an optimal 
solution for portfolio construction since the presence of conditional information will 
make such a solution to be dependent on it, taking into account that it provides the 
probability distribution of future outcomes. 
 
 Ferson & Siegel (2001) addressed this issue by proposing solutions who are 
nonlinear functions of the conditional parameters of returns that are important for 
the formulation of the optimal portfolio: mean and variance. Their objective was to 
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promote unconditional efficiency, due to the existence of information asymmetry. 
This problem can be exemplified by thinking about a manager and an investor. The 
former can use information about future returns when constructing the portfolio 
but, if the latter does not have access to that information, then the portfolio will not 
seem efficient.  
 
 The unconditionally efficient portfolio weights are very similar to other outcomes 
in traditional models such as CAPM, maximizing the utility achieved. However, 
such a realization only happens for central levels of the probability distribution that 
conditional information presents. For extreme realizations, there is the need for a 
more thoughtful approach, since very high expected returns are an opportunity to 
reduce risk without compromising the portfolio overall performance. 
 
 To complement their work, the authors provide solutions for unconditionally 
efficient portfolios in three different situations, with different combinations of one 
risky asset, one riskless asset and n risky assets present in the economy. In the end, 
their results prove to be robust and supports the importance of proper conditional 
















2.3. Board Composition and Firm’s Performance 
 
 Up until now, we have studied the performance of companies without considering 
their internal factors, more specifically, their board composition. Several authors 
have addressed this subject and its impact. Adams & Ferreira (2007) focused on the 
advisory role that boards may play, besides their usual monitoring of CEO’s 
activity. 
 
 This is due to the fact that the manager’s decisions are not always the ones that 
maximize shareholder value hence requiring an active participation from the board 
on the firm’s activity and decisions. Nonetheless, the authors argue that the board 
may use their members’ expertise to improve their overall decision-making 
processes, and it will improve as much as the board’s preferences are in line with 
the manager’s preferences. 
 
 However, for the latter to happen, the board needs that the CEO properly discloses 
information, which constitutes a trade-off for the manager. On one hand, the better 
the disclosure, the better the advice. On the other hand, this also gives the board 
higher leverage to intervene in future CEO’s decisions. Having said that, the authors 
conclude that the manager will not fully provide information about the company to 
a board that is highly independent. 
 
 Nevertheless, Adams & Ferreira (2007) also find that, when there are two entities 
performing the two roles (monitoring and advisory), such a trade-off no longer 
exists, which provides some support for the implementation of dual board systems. 
Notwithstanding, the authors show that, unless the benefits of control for the 
managers are too large, shareholders will be better off implementing a sole board 
system, although its effectiveness will be higher if the advisory role is also 
performed. 
 
 However, even the monitoring role isn’t as straightforward and, as Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera (2008) show, it has received higher attention in recent years with 
cases like the failure of Enron supporting the importance of this role. Among the 
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factors that may influence its effectiveness, gender is the one addressed by these 
authors, who wanted to evaluate whether the presence of women on company 
boards would improve the firm’s performance, taking into account the Spanish 
economy, since it was an European economy with civil law, contrasting with other 
existing studies with common law. 
 
 On the one hand, boards with women may increase shareholder value if they bring 
new ideas to improve decision-making within the company. On the other hand, 
their impact may be undesirable if the selection of women to be part of the board is 
based on pressure to have equality between sexes, instead of their qualifications. In 
a way, arguments around women’s share in boards can be divided between ethical 
and economic. The first refers to the immorality of excluding women from firm’s 
boards and supports the achievement of a more equitable representation, while the 
second is focused on the proper selection of candidates to the board of directors in 
order to maximize firm’s performance which, as mentioned above, may or may not 
be a woman. 
 
 The authors consider diverse explanations for the impact of gender on firm’s 
performance, from the greater diversity leading to a competitive advantage due to 
the company’s increasing ability of penetrating markets, to the full use of the diverse 
characteristics that are distributed among demographics and are influenced by 
gender. Nevertheless, their findings suggest that the presence of women on the 
board does not have an impact on firm’s performance. Notwithstanding, they also 
find that the balance between men and women on board has a positive impact in 
performance, which leads them to conclude that the presence of women will not 
destroy value to shareholders. 
 
 In line with these conclusions, we have seen market regulators putting gender 
diversity on the topics to debate, surrounding corporate governance. However, as 
Chapple & Humphrey (2014) report, the approaches of each regulator may differ, 
with some imposing quotas and others only recommending or requiring higher 
disclosure regarding firm’s gender composition. With this in mind, the authors 
investigated the impact of gender diversity in the financial performance, at an 
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aggregate level, building portfolios of firms with gender diversity and comparing 
their returns with firms without any women on the board. 
 
 The outcome of their analysis corroborated the findings of Campbell & Mínguez-
Vera (2008), having no suggestion of an impact in financial performance from the 
presence of women on boards and supporting the difficulty that seems to exist in 
finding economic arguments in favor of gender diversity, while using market data. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a justification for large firms to increase their 
diversity in order to promote their image before society, although that does not 
imply that they are looking for quantified economic and financial improvements. 
 
 Nonetheless, Chapple & Humphrey (2014) also highlight that their analysis of the 
Australian market had a constrain that could hinder the validity of the conclusion. 
More specifically, they found that the percentage of boards with two women on 
them was around 10% and, above that level (three or more) the sample considered 
had even lower percentages. In a way, this shows why the Australian market 
regulator decided to address this issue but also shows that it may not be possible to 
properly evaluate the impact of gender diversity on performance, since there may 
be required a large number of women on boards in order to have a visible impact.  
 
 At an European level, this issue was also addressed, with Ahern & Dittmar (2012) 
reporting a new law, written in 2003, which imposed quotas on Norway. This 
situation was seen by the authors as a good event to study the connection between 
firm value and board features, since there were changes in the board composition 
due to an exogenous factor. Their interest in it also came from the possibility of 
improving our understanding of such a connection since it was not easy to know 
whether the existence of experienced board members increased firm’s value or if the 
high firm value was responsible for the addition of more experienced members to 
their board, which was a similar problem to the one described by Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera (2008), regarding the selection of women to the board. 
 
 In Norway’s case, all public limited firms were forced to comply with the quota of 
at least 40% female directors and, obviously, the firms that already had a big 
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percentage of women on their boards faced less constraints and more easily reached 
the objective. Nevertheless, there was a negative impact on firm’s value across all 
the listed firms analyzed and, while the firms mentioned above had a lower impact, 
it showed that the huge reorganization imposed by the law affected shareholders’ 
returns. 
 
 Boards are built to maximize those returns and, according to Ahern & Dittmar 
(2012), each member’s characteristics were important to determine their capacity to 
perform the roles suggested in Adams & Ferreira (2007): monitoring and advisory. 
The authors find that female directors are substantially different than male directors 
and that it is reflected in the firm’s behavior afterwards. Notwithstanding, firms 
reacted differently to the imposed quota, with some maintaining board size and 
reshuffling their members, and others avoiding the quota by relocating or changing 
their status (i.e. from public to private). 
 
 Norway wasn’t the only case where initiatives and policies were taken, in order to 
promote gender diversity. However, such measures cannot be based on 
improvements to average firm performance, as Adams & Ferreira (2009) show. In 
their work, the authors try to answer a group of questions regarding women’s role 
on boards and their impact on its roles and, ultimately, on the firm’s performance. 
 
 Furthermore, Adams & Ferreira (2009) were cautious regarding one of the main 
problems on these types of analysis: endogeneity. Such a problem may bias the data 
estimations or predictions, not allowing for a casual interpretation to be given. With 
this sorted out, the analysis would be able to provide reliable information about the 
effectiveness of boards and, consequently, the plausibility, or not, of success for the 
policies mentioned above. 
 
 As Ahern & Dittmar (2012), Adams & Ferreira (2009) find that women on boards 
behave very differently from men, leading to repercussions on the firm’s behavior. 
Also, they corroborate the argument they presented before in Adams & Ferreira 
(2007) regarding the negative impact on shareholder value that an excess of 
monitoring may have. Since the study finds that women are more prone to have 
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monitoring functions in the board, such a finding may be a possible explanation for 
the value destruction in firms with higher governance structures that start to 
diversify their board’s gender composition.  
 
 Nonetheless, this work highlights the complexity of the relationship between 
gender diversity and firm’s performance, in contrast with the more linear 
appearance that some press may have given it. To further understand the issue, Gul 
et al. (2011) decided to check whether the role of female directors would have an 
impact on stock prices, due to a possible increase in disclosure of information and 
higher incentive to gather private information. 
 
 More precisely, the authors argue that the former comes from a higher transparency 
of the CEOs due to an increase in the monitoring of their activities. Function which 
the women are more prone to have, according to Adams & Ferreira (2009). 
Regarding the latter, women introduce changes in the usual way the board makes 
its deliberations since their behavior is different from men, as stated by Ahern & 
Dittmar (2012) and Adams & Ferreira (2009), making board members to have higher 
consideration of the consequences that derive from their decisions. 
 
 The authors find that there is a positive relation between gender diversity and stock 
price informativeness, while taking into account the endogeneity problem already 
mentioned in Adams & Ferreira (2009) and controlling for other variables like 
governance and earnings quality. Furthermore, they also state that the public 
disclosure effect is more likely in larger firms, while the higher procurement of 
private information is more easily found in small firms. The first is directly reflected 
in the stock price and the second is seen through the activity in trading, due to the 
more informed investors.  
 
  In the end, these findings show the association between earnings quality and 
trading activity with stock price informativeness, supporting the opinion of the 
authors that regulation being applied through different approaches, like the ones 
mentioned in Chapple & Humphrey (2014), help the advantages of gender diversity 
to be realized in a faster way. 
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 Notwithstanding, theses outcomes were not particular of developed markets and 
Nguyen et al. (2015) showed exactly that. Since Adams & Ferreira (2009) stated that 
the impact of a gender diverse board would depend on the structure of corporate 
governance previously present in the firm, the authors thought that the country they 
selected for their study, Vietnam, would benefit highly due to the overall poor 
corporate governance present on it. 
 
 Despite the usual structure in Vietnam being composed by two boards (one of 
directors and another of supervisors), similar to what Adams & Ferreira (2007) 
study, the functions of monitoring and advisory are concentrated on the first, while 
the second is only concerned with evaluating the annual financial statements and 
the performance of both, the board of directors and the CEO. Nevertheless, its role 
is quite inefficient since it does not have any clear guidelines on how to perform it, 
leaving each company to decide its approach. 
 
 In the end, the authors gave support to the works of Adams & Ferreira (2009) and 
Gul et al. (2011) by showing that, after controlling for several corporate governance 
factors, gender diversity seems to have a positive influence on firm’s performance. 
Such an outcome would be possible by the greater benefit of adding women to the 
board since, as mentioned above, the corporate governance structure in Vietnam 
was underdeveloped, and the increase on firm’s transparency would be reflected 








Chapter 3 - Methodology and Data 
 
3.1. Research Method 
 
 This work has the objective of evaluating whether building a portfolio with 
companies, while taking into account their Gender Diversity Index (GDI) score, will 
impact its performance. 
 
 With that in mind, two types of portfolio will be built based on the level of gender 
diversity present in the companies. In order to evaluate their performance, while on 
an unconditional level, the models used will range from the three-factor model 
proposed in Fama & French (1993) to the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), using 
the previous model and adding the momentum factor from Jegadeesh & Titman 
(1993), and the five-factor model of Fama & French (2015), while taking into account 
(Jensen, 1968) alpha. 
 
 Having said that, we will estimate, for each type of portfolio, nine linear 
regressions, making use, in all of them, of Stoxx 600 and MSCI World as market 
proxies, to compare regressions. The impact on performance caused by gender 
diversity, will be observed on the monthly returns of the portfolios and, in the end, 














3.2. Portfolio Composition  
 
 We based our selection on EWOB (2019) from the organization European Women on 
Boards (EWOB), where they gathered information from firms in the Stoxx 600 and 
made an hierarchy based on their boards’ gender composition and women’s roles 
in the company. Such analysis was compiled into a Gender Diversity Index (where 
a score of 1 means a board with 50/50 composition, and values below or above 1 
reveal a domination of males or females, respectively).  
 
 Afterwards, EWOB organized a Top 20 and a Bottom 20 based on the GDI score of 
the companies, being the former composed by firms with a GDI score at or above 
0.8 and the latter composed by firms with a GDI score at or below 0.2. Our two 
portfolios were built to mimic the Top 20 and Bottom 20 tables, and we collected 
data on each firm using Datastream, for the period between 2000 and 2019, with a 
monthly tenor. 
 
 We gathered information on the MV (Market Value) of each company and used 
Datastream’s datatype RI (Return Index), which includes the reinvestment of 
dividends, to allow us to properly calculate the monthly returns of the firms. Both 
of these indicators were adapted to be displayed in EUR (Euro) since, although all 
of the companies were part of Stoxx 600, there were some who belonged to countries 
with a currency other than Euro. 
 
 Furthermore, we also found the need to withdraw information on Stoxx 600 and 
MSCI World indexes, using the datatype RI for the first and MSRI for the latter, 
which did the same as RI but was specific for this index. The reason behind this was 
to allow us to compare regressions using the models mentioned above, replacing 






3.3. Models to estimate 
 
 As mentioned above, we will estimate regressions based on different models in the 
literature. Our main point is to evaluate if there are abnormal returns on our 
portfolios, using alpha to measure it,  as first employed by Jensen (1968), and see 
whether our portfolios had an outperformance (positive and significant alpha), 
underperformance (negative and significant alpha) or neutral performance (alpha 
not significantly different from zero). 
 
 Our first model will be Fama & French (1993) three-factor model: 
 
 
𝑅!" − 𝑅#" = 𝛼!" +	𝛽! ∙ *𝑅$" − 𝑅#"+ + 𝑠! ∙ 𝑆𝑀𝐵" +	ℎ! ∙ 𝐻𝑀𝐿" + 𝜀!" 
 
Where 𝑅!" represents portfolio 𝑖 return, on period 𝑡, 𝑅#" represents the risk-free 
asset’s return, on period 𝑡, 𝛼!" represents the abnormal return of portfolio 𝑖, in period 
𝑡, 𝛽! represents portfolio 𝑖 sensibility to general market variations (i.e. the systematic 
risk), 𝑅$" represents the return of the market portfolio, on period 𝑡, 𝑆𝑀𝐵" (Small 
minus Big) represents the difference in return between a diversified portfolio of 
small and large cap stocks, in period	𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿" (High minus Low) represents the 
difference in return between a diversified portfolio of high and low book-to-market 












 When we consider Carhart (1997) model: 
 
𝑅!" − 𝑅#" = 𝛼!" +	𝛽! ∙ *𝑅$" − 𝑅#"+ + 𝑠! ∙ 𝑆𝑀𝐵" +	ℎ! ∙ 𝐻𝑀𝐿" +	𝑤! ∙ 𝑊𝑀𝐿" +	𝜀!" 
 
	𝑊𝑀𝐿" (Winners minus Losers) represents the difference between diversified 
portfolios of stocks that performed well and bad in the recent past, in period 𝑡. The 
remaining variables were already explained above.  
 
 On unconditional performance, the last model is Fama & French (2015) five-factor 
model, which we can state as follows: 
	
𝑅!" − 𝑅#" = 𝛼!" +	𝛽! ∙ *𝑅$" − 𝑅#"+ + 𝑠! ∙ 𝑆𝑀𝐵" +	ℎ! ∙ 𝐻𝑀𝐿" +	𝑟! ∙ 𝑅𝑀𝑊" +	𝑐! ∙ 𝐶𝑀𝐴"
+ 𝜀!" 
 
 Where, 𝑅𝑀𝑊" (Robust minus Weak) represents the difference between a diversified 
portfolio of stocks with robust and weak profitability, in period 𝑡 and 𝐶𝑀𝐴" 
(Conservative minus Aggressive) represents the difference between a diversified 
portfolio of stocks with a conservative and an aggressive investment profile, in 
















 In order to estimate these models, we decided to build two portfolios using 40 
companies present in the Stoxx 600 index, gathering data for the period between 
January 2000 and December 2019. Each portfolio had 20 companies and they were 
divided using the Gender Diversity Index (GDI) provided by the organization 
EWOB (European Women On Boards), who created this score for all the companies 
present in the index. Therefore, the 20 that had the highest GDI were joined to form 
one portfolio (Top 20) while the 20 that had the lowest GDI formed the other one 
(Bottom 20). 
 
 Additionally, we used Thomson-Reuters’ Datastream Database to obtain data for 
the period mentioned above, on a monthly basis, for their share price and their 
market value (MV), in order to calculate their monthly returns and adequately 
create the equal-weighted and the value-weighted portfolios. 
 
 The index where such companies are present, Stoxx 600, is a dynamic index, i.e. its 
composition may change along the time, according to the way its components 
behave and are impacted by the market conditions. Furthermore, it is an index that 
focuses on European countries and has companies with diverse characteristics, from 
large to mid and small capitalization. This index data, along with the MSCI World 
Index, which is an index that covers large and mid-cap firms in all developed 
countries, were also obtained from Thomson-Reuters’ Datastream Database, on a 
monthly basis. 
 
 To complement our analysis, and apply the models required, we needed to gather 
data on the factors that help explaining the difference on our portfolios’ returns. In 
order to achieve that, we used the data present on Ken French’s website, while 
taking into account that all our companies are European. 
 
 Lastly, we built the portfolios, as mentioned above, and then created two 
subdivisions on each of them: one equally weighted and another that based each 
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company’s impact on its percentage of the total MV of the portfolio (value-
weighted). 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics for the monthly returns of Top 20 and Bottom 20 Portfolios equally   
weighted (EW)and value weighted (VW), from a total of 239 observations. 
Portfolio Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Top 20 
(VW) 0.0116 0.0132 0.0409 -0.1190 0.1420 
Top 20 
(EW) 0.0118 0.0148 0.0467 -0.1490 0.2060 
Bot 20 
(VW) 0.0147 0.0191 0.0568 -0.2580 0.2410 
Bot 20 
(EW) 0.0162 0.0216 0.0510 -0.1690 0.2110 
 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the portfolios we built. At a first glance, 
we can see that all portfolios had a positive average return, which is also supported 
by their median showing they kept that level, at least 50% of the horizon time.  
 
 Nevertheless, it is important to remark that the equally weighted portfolio with the 
Bottom 20 companies (Bot 20 EW) had a median above 0.02, which highlights a 
possible better performance from this portfolio when joined with the fact that it 
presents the highest average. 
 
 Furthermore, we also observe that the amplitude of the portfolios’ returns is quite 
big, having values that range from -0.258 to 0.241, both being achieved on the value-
weighted Bottom 20 (Bot 20 VW) portfolio.  
 
 All in all, we can see that the Bottom 20 portfolios performed better, albeit having 
higher volatility, showed on their higher standard deviation as well as on the 





           Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics of the variables used in our analysis, from a total of 239 observations; 
       * Stoxx 600 and Exc_Stoxx600 statistics are derived from 228 observations due to the availability data. 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Exc_RPewTop 0.0104 0.0133 0.0468 -0.1490 0.2060 
Exc_RPvwTop 0.0103 0.0109 0.0409 -0.1210 0.1410 
Exc_RPewBot 0.0149 0.0216 0.0511 -0.1720 0.2100 
Exc_RPvwBot 0.0133 0.0179 0.0569 -0.2600 0.2360 
MktRF 0.0042 0.0059 0.0518 -0.2200 0.1370 
SMB1 0.0012 0.0016 0.0201 -0.0689 0.0490 
SMB2 0.0019 0.0022 0.0197 -0.0741 0.0479 
HML 0.0042 0.0038 0.0259 -0.0945 0.1120 
RMW 0.0031 0.0036 0.0166 -0.0484 0.0608 
CMA 0.0032 0.0012 0.0184 -0.0733 0.0875 
WML 0.0075 0.0098 0.0427 -0.2610 0.1370 
MSCI 0.0046 0.0093 0.0397 -0.1170 0.1150 
Exc_MSCI 0.0032 0.0071 0.0399 -0.1180 0.1150 
Stoxx600* 0.0043 0.0107 0.0430 -0.1410 0.1450 
Exc_Stoxx600* 0.0031 0.0103 0.0431 -0.1420 0.1450 
 
 
 The first four variables: Exc_RPewTop, Exc_RPvwTop, Exc_RPewBot and 
Exc_RPvwBot represent the excess return of the equally weighted portfolio (in the 
case of Exc_RPewTop and Exc_RPewBot) over the risk free rate, and the same 
reasoning applies to the value weighted portfolios (Exc_RPvwTop and 
Exc_RPvwBot). Additionally, the first two variables represent the portfolios with 
the Top 20 companies, regarding GDI score, while the next two represent the 
portfolios with the Bottom 20 companies. Having said that, we can classify them as 
our explained variables, following the methodology already exposed in the 
previous chapter, (𝑅!" − 𝑅#"). 
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 The variables MktRF, SMB and HML are present in both Fama & French (1993) and 
Fama & French (2015), but RMW and CMA are only present in the latter, while 
WML is a variable introduced in Carhart (1997). Nevertheless, all these variables 
were already explained in the previous chapter, therefore, in order to avoid 
redundancy, we will kindly ask to refer to that chapter for clarification on their 
meaning. 
 
 The bottom four variables: MSCI, Exc_MSCI, Stoxx600 and Exc_Stoxx600 are 
variables that we decided to use as a proxy for our market variable, in order to 
compare with the regressions obtained by using the market factor from Fama & 
French (1993): MktRF. MSCI and Stoxx 600 represent the return from the MSCI 
World Index and the Stoxx 600 Index, respectively. However, in order to have 
comparable regressions, we also calculated Exc_MSCI and Exc_Stoxx600, which is 
the excess return of both indexes over the risk-free rate (𝑅$" − 𝑅#"). 
 
 Since the risk-free rate is a common factor to the first four variables, it is with no 
surprise that we conclude the same as in the previous section, where we analyzed 
the returns of each portfolio. The portfolios with the Bottom 20 companies seem to 
perform better in both situations, equally and value weighted. Nevertheless, it is 
worth to mention that all portfolios have positive average excess returns, which 
shows that their performance was superior to the one of the risk-free asset. 
 
 The MktRF shows a positive average excess return over the risk-free rate (0.0042) 
but, when compared with our explained variables, all of them have higher average 
excess returns, hinting at an average performance not only better than the risk-free 
asset but also better than the market factor itself.  
 
 Regarding the difference in return between a diversified portfolio of small and 
large cap stocks (SMB1 and SMB2)1, we see that, on average, small cap stocks 
outperform large cap stocks (0.0012 and 0.0019).Additionally, we see that 
 
1 SMB1 referes to the data used for SMB variable on the three and four-factor models, while SMB2 refers to the 
data used for SMB variable on the five-factor model. 
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companies with a high book-to-market ratio have higher returns than the ones with 
a low book-to-market ratio (0.0042), given by HML. The amplitude of values on the 
first is rather low, with maximum and minimum never going above the absolute 
value of 0.1, while on the latter that threshold is surpassed when considering the 
maximum. 
 
 On the WML factor, we can see that, on average, the companies with a better past 
performance have a tendency to have higher returns than the ones with a worse 
past performance, presenting a difference that is close to 1%, on a monthly basis. 
 
 The last two factors: RMW and CMA, reveal that companies with strong 
profitability have, on average, higher returns than companies with weak 
profitability, while companies with a conservative investment profile are, on 
average, better performers than companies with an aggressive investment profile. 
 
 Finally, our two variables to replace the MktRF factor and work as a proxy for the 
market itself: Exc_MSCI and Exc_Stoxx600. These have lower average excess 
returns, when compared with MktRF (0.0032 and 0.0031, respectively), although 
very similar among themselves. Nevertheless, they present lower volatility than 













Chapter 4 – Regression Results 
 
In this chapter we will analyze the outcome provided by the statistical software 
Gretl, used to estimate the models mentioned in the previous chapter, using the 
data and the portfolios already described. 
 
 Notwithstanding, it stand as important to mention that all the outcome posted here 
took into account the necessary adjustments to avoid issues related with 
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity, in order to improve the value of the results 
obtained. 
 
 Last but not least, we will divide this chapter into subchapters concerning each of 
the models (three-factor, four-factor and five-factor). In all, both the outcome and 



















4.1. Three-Factor Model 
 
 Table 3, 4 and 5 below highlights the outcome of our estimation following the three-
factor model proposed in Fama & French (1993), while using alpha (a), as showed 
in Jensen (1968), to measure the existence and significance of abnormal returns for 
both portfolios. The main difference among the tables comes from the use of 
different variables for the market proxy. 
  
Table 3 - OLS estimation of the three-factor model (Monthly data from January 2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant  0.0076***    (0.0021) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0018)    
0.0122*** 
(0.0020)     
0.0107*** 
(0.0028) 
MktRF 0.6946***   (0.0481)    
0.5731*** 
(0.0437)     
0.7260*** 
(0.0621)     
0.7545*** 
(0.0827) 
SMB −0.1067  (0.1442)     
−0.3243*** 





HML −0.0108   (0.1217)      
−0.0903 
(0.1036)     
−0.1879 
(0.1257)     
−0.2254 
(0.1703)    
     
R2 0.5904 0.5439 0.5291 0.4562 
F-Test 72.0884 64.7161  47.8412    28.4075    
Note: Based on 239 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 













Table 4 - OLS estimation of the three-factor model, with Stoxx 600 as a market proxy (Monthly data from 
December 2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant 0.0066*** (0.0011) 
0.0075*** 
(0.0011)     
0.0112*** 
(0.0016)     
0.0082*** 
(0.0017)     
Exc_Stoxx600 1.0278*** (0.0367) 
0.8543*** 




(0.0682)    
SMB 0.2567*** (0.0776) 
−0.0234 
(0.0966)      
0.6726*** 
(0.1263)      
0.6797*** 
(0.1922)      




(0.1018)     
−0.1761 
(0.1150)      
     
R2 0.8432 0.7919 0.7201 0.7176 
F-Test 268.0947    108.6819    176.4831    98.11396  
Note: Based on 228 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 
represents a p-value < 0.01, ** represents a p-value <0.05 and * represents a p-value <0.10. 
 
 
Table 5 - OLS estimation of the three-factor model with MSCI as a market proxy (Monthly data from January 
2000 to December 2019) 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant 0.0055*** (0.0016) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0015)         
0.0099*** 
(0.0019)     
0.0083*** 
(0.0025)     
Exc_MSCI 0.9697*** (0.0587) 
0.7751*** 
(0.0624)             
1.0238*** 
(0.0583)    
1.0653*** 
(0.0858)    
SMB 0.1871* (0.1014) 
−0.0913 
(0.0956)      
0.6661*** 
(0.1214)      
0.6496*** 
(0.1832)       
HML 0.3665*** (0.0717) 
0.2177*** 
(0.0669)      
0.2079** 
(0.0930)      
0.1861 
(0.1196)       
     
R2 0.6758 0.5835 0.6192 0.5362 
F-Test 91.0410 59.2567 105.5245    53.2562    
Note: Based on 239 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 




 Jensen (1968)’s alpha provides us with the suggestion that all portfolios, on average, 
have an excess return (𝑅!" − 𝑅#") which is statistically significant for all levels. 
Nevertheless, such finding does not help on answering our question since the 
regressions have different factors. 
 
 Regarding the SMB (Small Minus Big) factor we have mixed results. On the Bottom 
20 portfolios we can see a positive and statically significant contribution to the 
excess return on most of them, being the exception the VW (Value-Weighted) 
portfolio in our first regression (using the market factor provided in Ken French’s 
website as a proxy for the market). When taking into account the Top 20 portfolios, 
the outcome is not so clear. On the regression with the market factor from Ken 
French’s website, we have a negative and statistically significant impact on the VW 
portfolio, while the EW does not have a statistically significant contribution. When 
we consider the Stoxx 600 as our market proxy, we have an opposite outcome, 
where the EW portfolio has a positive and statistically significant impact while the 
VW portfolio does not seem to have an impact that is statistically significant. When 
considering the MSCI index as our market proxy, we obtain a similar outcome to 
the Stoxx 600 proxy. However, our EW portfolio only has a positive and statistically 
significant contribution from SMB for the level of significance of 10%. 
 
 The HML factor only has statistical significance when used with MSCI as a market 
proxy, revealing a positive contribution on both Top 20 portfolios. However, the 
same significance is not reflected on the Bottom 20 portfolios since only the EW 
portfolio has a statistically significant impact, even though only for a 5% 
significance level. 
 
 Last, but not least, we have to address our measure of sensitivity to market 
variations, beta. In here, our results reveal different sensitivities for the different 
variables we used as proxies, which was expected. Nonetheless, independent of the 
proxy used, the market factor has a statistically significant impact on all portfolios 
with the Bottom 20 portfolios having, on average, a higher sensitivity than the Top 
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20 portfolios, with the only exception being the EW Portfolio which reveals a higher 
sensitivity on the Top 20. 
 
 Furthermore, the higher sensitivity is seen when the proxy used is the Stoxx 600, 
which may be due to the fact that all the companies present on the analysis are 
constituents of this index. Between each variable used as a proxy for the market, we 
can see that the difference between Bottom 20 and Top 20 portfolios is wider when 
we are considering the MSCI, being the former’s portfolios the ones with the higher 
sensitivity. Notwithstanding, both proxies introduced in this study have higher 
sensitivities than the one used in Fama & French (1993). 
 
 As for R2, the model which seems to better suit the data is the one with the Stoxx 
600 as a proxy which, again, may come from the fact that every company in this 
study is a component of such index. Nevertheless, when we compare the MSCI 
proxy with the market factor from Ken French’s website, we see that the regression 
from the former has a higher value than the latter, which suggests that the addition 















4.2. Four-Factor Model 
 
 Table 6, 7 and 8 below highlights the outcome of our estimation following the four-
factor model proposed in Carhart (1997), based on the previous model but adding 
the momentum factor proposed by Jegadeesh & Titman (1993), while using alpha 
(a), as showed in Jensen (1968), to measure the existence and significance of 
abnormal returns for both portfolios.  
 
Table 6 - OLS estimation of the four-factor model (Monthly data from January 2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant      0.0094*** (0.0020)         
     0.0091***  
(0.0018)    
     0.0144*** 
(0.0020)    
     0.0137*** 
(0.0027)    
MktRF 0.6345*** (0.0423)     
0.5546*** 
(0.0451)       
0.6519*** 
(0.0516)     
0.6549*** 
(0.0626)     
SMB −0.0499  (0.1296)     
−0.3069*** 
(0.1083)       
0.4253*** 
(0.1204)       
0.4202** 
(0.1839)       
HML −0.0650 (0.1122)    
−0.1069 
(0.1014)       
−0.2547** 
(0.1212)    
−0.3151** 
(0.1520)      
WML −0.1855***  (0.0587)    
−0.0570  
(0.0496)    
−0.2290*** 
(0.0661)    
−0.3077*** 
(0.0865)    
     
R2 0.6109 0.5447 0.5554 0.4952 
F-Test 67.9760    49.0932    48.8848 30.8135  
Note: Based on 239 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 











Table 7 -OLS estimation of the four-factor model, with Stoxx 600 as a market proxy (Monthly data from 
December 2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant 0.0064*** (0.0012)             
0.0060*** 
(0.0013)      
0.0121*** 
(0.0019)     
0.0095*** 
(0.0020)     
Exc_Stoxx600  1.0368*** (0.0368)     
0.9221*** 
(0.0394)      
0.9803*** 
(0.0459)     
1.0337*** 
(0.0624)     
SMB 0.2566*** (0.0776)       
 −0.0236 
(0.0887)    
0.6727*** 
(0.1266)      
0.6799*** 
(0.1898)       
HML 0.0524 (0.0748)       
 −0.0503 
(0.0599)     
−0.0478 
(0.0994)    
−0.1931* 
(0.1099)      
WML 0.0177 (0.0426)       
0.1333*** 
(0.0475)      
−0.0808 
(0.0666)     
−0.1117 
(0.0820)     
     
R2 0.8427 0.8037 0.7219 0.7216 
F-Test 220.5939 139.5777    173.7442    108.7554    
Note: Based on 228 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 
represents a p-value < 0.01, ** represents a p-value <0.05 and * represents a p-value <0.10. 
 
Table 8 - OLS estimation of the four-factor model with MSCI as a market proxy (Monthly data from January 
2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant 0.0067*** (0.0016)      
0.0070*** 
(0.0017)      
0.0115*** 
(0.0021)     
0.0108*** 
(0.0025)    
Exc_MSCI 0.9181*** (0.0575)      
0.7735*** 
(0.0707)      
0.9551*** 
(0.0560)     
0.9599*** 
(0.0667)     
SMB 0.2050** (0.1001)        
−0.0907 
(0.0946)     
0.6899*** 
(0.1210)       
0.6861*** 
(0.1809)       
HML 0.3148*** (0.0650)      
0.2161*** 
(0.0644)       
0.1392 
(0.0972)      
0.0807 
(0.1087)       
WML −0.1010** (0.0454)      
−0.0035 
(0.0575)      
−0.1463** 
(0.0707)     
−0.2245*** 
(0.0726)     
     
R2 0.6819 0.5817 0.6286 0.5552 
F-Test 82.1458  44.3602    106.3112  63.8748    
Note: Based on 239 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 
represents a p-value < 0.01, ** represents a p-value <0.05 and * represents a p-value <0.10. 
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 As a start, the introduction of the momentum factor seems to be a positive addition 
to the explanatory power of our model. Such a statement is supported by the 
increase on R2 with only one portfolio (Top 20 VW on Table 8) having a decrease in 
it. Nevertheless, the difference is very small hence we can consider the overall 
impact of the introduction of the new factor as positive. 
 
 Furthermore, we also kept a statistically significant and positive alpha (constant) 
which shows that, on average, our portfolios have an excess return, even after 
introducing one more factor. 
 
 Looking at the SMB factor, on the Bottom 20 portfolios we have a similar impact as 
in the previous model, although one of them (Bottom 20 VW on Table 6) only has a 
statistically significant impact for a 5% level of significance, instead of the 1% of 
before. When observing the Top 20 values, again we find the same pattern of mixed 
outcomes as in the previous model, with an improvement on the impact when we 
compare table 8 with table 5. the former has a statistically significant impact for a 
5% significance level, while the latter only has it for a 10% level. 
 
 On HML, again we find its impact more strongly and positively pronounced on 
Table 8 (with MSCI index as a market proxy) for the Top 20 portfolios while, unlike 
in the three-factor model, the Bottom 20 portfolios do not have any significant 
impact. However, the situation changes we consider Table 6 and 7, comparing them 
with Table 3 and 4. In here, the Bottom 20 portfolios have a significant impact, even 
though not at the 1% level of significance, that ranges from the VW portfolio on 
Table 7 (10% level of significance) to both on Table 6 (5% significance level). 
Furthermore, it seems worth to mention that the HML factor’s impact on the Bottom 
20 contributes negatively to the alpha constant (excess return), while contributing 
positively for the Top 20’s alpha constant. 
 
 The new factor, WML, has a significant, and negative, impact on the first regression 
(Table 6), being the Bottom 20 EW portfolio the only one who is not affected by it. 
However, the impact is not as straightforward in the following two variations we 
tested. On Table 7, we can see that only Top 20 VW portfolio is affected, positively, 
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by it while on Table 8 the broad impact is again seen, even though with a lower 
statistical significance (most cases are only for the 5% level)  and a change on the 
portfolio that was unaffected, when compared with Table 6, since Top 20 VW is 
unaffected instead of the Bottom 20 EW portfolio. 
 
 Regarding market sensitivity, the addition of the new factor did not bring any 
interference at this level, since we have the same conclusions as in the previous 
model, seeing a positive and statistically significant impact on all portfolios and 
having Table 7 (with Stoxx 600 as a market proxy) as the regression where the 





















4.3. Five-Factor Model 
 
 Table 9, 10 and 11 show the outcome of our estimation following the five-factor 
model proposed in Fama & French (2015), based on the three-factor model already 
studied, but adding two more factors related with profitability (RMW) and 
investment profile (CMA), while using alpha (a), as showed in Jensen (1968), to 




Table 9 - OLS estimation of the five-factor model (Monthly data from January 2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant 0.0090*** (0.0021) 
0.0080*** 
(0.0020)      
0.0150*** 
(0.0023)     
0.0154*** 
(0.0033) 




(0.0667)      
0.5940*** 
(0.0895)     
SMB −0.1507 (0.1329) 
−0.3512*** 
(0.1014)       
0.3178** 
(0.1248)       
0.2567 
(0.1875)       
HML 0.1411 (0.1771) 
0.1514 
(0.1340)        
−0.1736 
(0.1640)      
−0.1893 
(0.2268)      
RMW −0.1147 (0.1775) 
0.2813** 
(0.1373)        
−0.4750*** 
(0.1590)      
−0.7550*** 
(0.2295)     
CMA −0.3792** (0.1834) 
−0.2842* 
(0.1473)     
−0.3795* 
(0.1979)      
−0.6031** 
(0.2676)      
     
R2 0.5990 0.5536 0.5500 0.5024 
F-Test 50.79542 48.73416    41.0839 30.5220 
Note: Based on 239 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 







Table 10 - OLS estimation of the five-factor model, with Stoxx 600 as a market proxy (Monthly data from 
December 2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant 0.0061*** (0.0012)     
0.0052*** 
(0.0013)      
0.0118*** 
(0.0019)     
0.0101*** 
(0.0019)     
Exc_Stoxx600  1.0373*** (0.0390) 
0.9211*** 
(0.0409)     
1.0057*** 
(0.0532)     
1.0192*** 
(0.0695)    
SMB 0.2632*** (0.0826) 
 0.0049 
(0.0913)     
0.6877*** 
(0.1303)       
0.6518*** 
(0.2002)      
HML 0.0676 (0.1097) 
 0.0391 
(0.0892)      
−0.1497 
(0.1459)      
−0.2741 
(0.1874)      
RMW 0.0726 (0.1155) 
0.4157*** 
(0.1395)        
−0.2174 
(0.1616)      
−0.3881** 
(0.1654)      




(0.1681)      
−0.1946 
(0.2280) 
     
R2 0.8425 0.8076 0.7215 0.7243 
F-Test 196.9257    128.3673    120.7367 77.8028    
Note: Based on 228 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 

















Table 11 - OLS estimation of the five-factor model with MSCI as a market proxy (Monthly data from January 
2000 to December 2019); 
 Top 20 Bottom 20 
 EW VW EW VW 
Constant       0.0068*** (0.0017)     
     0.0064*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0126*** 
(0.0023)     
0.0129*** 
(0.0030)     
Exc_MSCI 0.8874*** (0.0524)    
0.7433*** 
(0.0614)      
0.9089*** 
(0.0643)     
0.8821*** 
(0.0923)     
SMB 0.1144 (0.0908)     
−0.1378* 
(0.0790)     
0.5933*** 
(0.1242)       
0.5281*** 
(0.1812)       
HML 0.4892*** (0.1372)       
 0.4658*** 
(0.1141)       
0.1727 
(0.1313)       
0.1362 
(0.1791)       
RMW −0.0924 (0.1577)      
 0.2731* 
(0.1423)       
−0.4399** 
(0.1986)      
−0.7085*** 
(0.2177)      
CMA −0.4095*** (0.1506)      
−0.3591** 
(0.1506)      
−0.3881** 
(0.1604)      
−0.5886** 
(0.2276)      
     
R2 0.6867 0.5990 0.6389 0.5793 
F-Test 73.1839  46.1297   85.5053    60.1439    
Note: Based on 239 observations. HAC robust standard-errors are inserted between parentheses. *** 
represents a p-value < 0.01, ** represents a p-value <0.05 and * represents a p-value <0.10. 
 
The addition of the new factors to the three-factor model seems to improve its 
explanatory power. However, when compared with the improvement realized by 
adding the momentum factor, we see that it is a very similar improvement. This 
situation may come from the characteristics of our subset of companies which may 
expose them more to one factor than another. Nevertheless, we still see a positive 
and statistically significant alpha (constant) which, as before, suggests the existence 
of an excess return on the portfolios chosen so we will, as in the previous models, 
analyze the impact of each factor. 
 
 The SMB factor in this regression lost some influence, since not all Bottom 20 
portfolios have a statistically significant and positive impact as before. Table 10 and 
11 keep such influence but Table 9 shows a different picture with only the EW 
portfolio having an impact from SMB and only at the 5% level of significance. 
Notwithstanding, our Top 20 portfolios show the same impact that we saw on the 
first model, and was little change on the previous model, having only a difference 
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concerning the portfolio that has a negative impact, at the 10% level of significance, 
on Table 11 (MSCI proxy). On this situation, unlike the previous two models (Table 
5 and 8), the portfolio that is impacted is the Top 20 VW and not the EW. 
 
 When we look into the impact from the HML factor we can see that, in this model, 
it has the least impact. In fact, only the Top 20 portfolios in Table 11 (MSCI proxy) 
have a significant and positive impact from the HML factor while all the other 
instances studied reveal no impact from this factor. This contrasts with the previous 
studies since the impact from this factor was felt in other situations, even though 
not for levels of significance of 1% but is in line with what Fama & French (2015) 
suggest regarding the redundancy of this factor. 
 
 The RMW factor provides us with different outcomes and impacts, being the 
Bottom 20 portfolios the only ones that have a statistically significant and negative 
impact for all levels of significance (Table 9). Besides those, we have various level 
of impact and significance for the Top 20 portfolios, although never going below the 
5% level, except for the instance of the VW portfolio on Table 10. The same situation 
can be observed over the influence of the CMA factor, although in this case there is 
one regression where this factor has no influence, in whichever portfolio observed 
(Table 10, Stoxx 600 proxy). Apart from that, we observe several levels of statistical 
significance for this factor, for both portfolios, always contributing negatively and 
only achieving the level of 1% significance in one instance: Top 20 EW portfolio on 
Table 11.  
  
 The market sensitivity of this portfolios to the various variables used as proxies is 
in line with the previous two regressions, registering a higher sensitivity for the 
Stoxx 600 index, being followed by the MSCI index and the market factor available 




Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 
 The present work aimed at adding to an existing debate on the finance world 
regarding the equality of genre in company’s boards. Using the European Women on 
Boards’ document, we attempted to analyze the impact of this factor on the financial 
performance of the companies to check whether there was a significant impact and, 
if such, in which direction (positive or negative). 
 
 In all our models, we could see significant constants (alpha) suggesting that both 
portfolios have abnormal and significant returns, with the Bottom 20 (portfolio of 
companies with GDI score below 0.2) having a slight edge over the Top 20 (portfolio 
of companies with GDI score above 0.8) and, more precisely, the EW (equally-
weighted) portfolio, suggesting that the presence of women on the board does not 
benefit the companies in terms of the market perception regarding value creation. 
Regarding our proxies for the market variable, our outcome indicates that they have 
more influence on explaining the returns of our portfolio, even though one of them, 
Stoxx 600, was already suspected to give us such an outcome since all companies 
form the portfolios are present in it. 
 
 Regarding our models, we see that both the four-factor and the five-factor seems to 
fare better than the three-factor model even though, between them, it is not easy to 
establish one as superior. These statements are based on both the statistical 
significance of the factors and their fit, given by their R2. The similar pattern of 
fitness between the portfolios may come from the characteristics of our data, which 
may make it more exposed to one factor than another, as well as our choice of 
market proxies (as an example we can see the impact of WML factor with Stoxx 600 
as a proxy for our market variable is almost null, while in the model with Ken 
French’s website factor is rather significant).  
 
 This also highlights some of the limitations of our analysis. Despite our usage of an 
official document from an European entity, we only got access to data already 
processed, and not being able to check how it was treated and organized may hinder 
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our ability to withdraw conclusions from the outcome. Furthermore, regarding, 
what appears to be an advantage of the Bottom 20 EW portfolio over the Bottom 20 
VW portfolio, we should remind that, in this analysis, it was not taken into account 
any transaction costs, which would have considerable impact on the EW portfolio 
since it always needs to keep the weight of each component constant, despite its 
variations. 
 
 Expanding on the limitation regarding data access, we can also find an opportunity 
for further research where we would organize the data in different ways, dividing 
by the roles each women had on the boards and the actual influence they had on 
the company’s decisions, or allowing for the division between age groups to see 
which companies are more prone to have a gender diverse board, younger or older. 
Notwithstanding, our analysis would also benefit on the introduction of conditional 
performance, allowing for the time variation of betas and verifying whether the 
impact of gender diversity in boards is relevant on an ever-changing economic 
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